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673 
ACTA ON LIFE SUPPORT: WHY THE ANTI-
COUNTERFEITING TRADE AGREEMENT IS 
FAILING AND HOW FUTURE INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY TREATIES MIGHT AVOID A 
SIMILAR FATE 
INTRODUCTION 
The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (―ACTA‖ or ―Agreement‖) 
is an international intellectual property treaty that provides for new 
international minimum standards for criminal and civil enforcement of 
intellectual property rights.
1
 The categories of subject matter protected by 
the agreement are borrowed from the Agreement on Trade-Related 
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (―TRIPS‖),2 and ACTA expands 
upon the limited criminal enforcement standards present in TRIPS.
3
 
ACTA is an agreement created outside the auspices of multilateral 
organizations
4
 and has been fraught with controversy since its initial talks 
 
 
 1. A signing ceremony was held on October 1, 2011 in Tokyo, Japan, at which Australia, 
Canada, Japan, Korea, Morocco, New Zealand, Singapore, and the United States signed the 
Agreement. Joint Press Statement of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement Negotiating Parties, 
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE (Oct. 2011), available at http://www.ustr 
.gov/about-us/press-office/press-releases/2011/october/joint-press-statement-anti-counterfeiting-trade-ag. 
While not signing it, the European Union, Mexico, and Switzerland ―confirmed their continuing strong 
support for and preparations to sign the Agreement as soon as practicable.‖ Id. Twenty-two EU 
member nations have since signed the Agreement, though it has not been ratified by the European 
Parliament, arguably because of public backlash against the Agreement. Dave Lee, Acta Protests: 
Thousands Take to the Streets Across Europe, BBC NEWS (Feb. 11, 2012, 1:57 PM), available at 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-16999497. The Agreement will enter into force once six 
member nations enter instruments of ―ratification, acceptance or approval.‖ Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement art. 40(1), opened for signature Oct. 1, 2011 [hereinafter ACTA or Agreement], available 
at http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/economy/i_property/pdfs/acta1105_en.pdf. The other parties to the 
Agreement are Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the 
Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, and Sweden. Id. art. 39 n.17. 
 2. Id. art. 5(h). The categories of intellectual property protected under TRIPS are copyrights, 
trademarks, geographical indications, industrial designs, patents, layout-designs of integrated circuits, 
and protection of undisclosed information. See Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights Part II, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 [hereinafter TRIPS, TRIPS Agreement, 
TRIPS Part II or TRIPS Agreement Part II]. 
 3. TRIPS provides only that ―[m]embers shall provide for criminal procedures and penalties to 
be applied at least in cases of willful trademark counterfeiting or copyright piracy on a commercial 
scale,‖ and allows for imprisonment and fines commensurate with the offense. TRIPS Agreement, 
supra note 2, art. 61. 
 4. Unlike many other international IP treaties, ACTA was conceived of and drafted independent 
of multilateral organizations such as the World Trade Organization (―WTO‖) or the World Intellectual 
Property Organization (―WIPO‖). See Eddan Katz & Gwen Hinze, The Impact of the Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement on the Knowledge Economy: The Accountability of the Office of the 
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in 2006, with criticism ranging from its negotiations lacking transparency 
to its very existence merely being an initiative by rights holders to increase 
the international power of their intellectual property rights.
5
 Events in 
2012 have created significant uncertainty as to the likelihood of the 
agreement coming into effect; the European Union parliament 
affirmatively declined to ratify it,
6
 and several European nations have 
refused to ratify ACTA in the wake of large protests.
7
  
This Note is concerned with one particular criticism of ACTA: that 
despite its title and provisions for counterfeit goods, it is primarily a 
copyright treaty designed to respond to growing concerns of rights holders 
with respect to digital copyright infringement.
8
 Whether or not this 
criticism is valid, ACTA does contain several provisions relating to 
copyright infringement and piracy, both physical and digital, which are not 
present in prior IP treaties.
9
 And although the future of ACTA is far from 
certain (and likely far from bright), its goals within this sphere of 
 
 
U.S. Trade Representative for the Creation of IP Enforcement Norms Through Executive Trade 
Agreements, 35 YALE J. INT‘L L. ONLINE 24, 26 (2009), http://www.yjil.org/docs/pub/o-35-katz-
hinze-ACTA-on-knowledge-economy.pdf (arguing that parties to ACTA chose to negotiate apart from 
these organizations because they lack enforcement power). 
 5. See Charles McManis, The Proposed Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA): Two 
Tales of a Treaty, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 1235 (2009). The negotiations for the Agreement were carried out 
behind ―closed doors‖ while industry representatives were provided with information not available to 
the general public. Id. at 1236. Even more conspicuously, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative 
(―USTR‖) in 2009 denied a Freedom of Information Act request for documents related to the 
Agreement‘s negotiations on the claim that they were state secrets. Id. at 1238; see also Grant Gross, 
Obama Administration Says Treaty Text Is State Secret, PC WORLD (Mar. 13, 2009), http://www.pc 
world.com/article/161234/article.html (citing to a letter from the USTR stating that ―information in 
ACTA . . . is ‗properly classified in the interest of national security‘‖). 
 6. The EU parliament rejected ACTA by a plenary vote of 478–39 on July 4, 2012. European 
Parliament Rejects ACTA, EUR. PARLIAMENT (July 2–5, 2012), http://www.europarl.europa.eu/ 
news/en/headlines/content/20120618FCS47114/9/html/European-Parliament-rejects-ACTA. After the 
parliament‘s rejection of the agreement, the European Commission suggested that it would seek an 
opinion of the EU Court of Justice on the compatibility of ACTA with EU law to make it seem more 
palatable to its detractors, but by the end of 2012 the EC withdrew its request for an opinion. See Jack 
Phillips, „End of the Road‟ for ACTA in Europe, THE EPOCH TIMES (Dec. 20, 2012), available at 
http://www.theepochtimes.com/n2/world/327064-327064.html. 
 7. See Acta Approval Stalled by European Commission, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 22, 2012, 11:24 
AM), available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2012/feb/22/acta-stalled-european-comm 
ission (reporting that Bulgaria, the Netherlands, Poland, and Germany have refused to ratify ACTA); 
see also Charles Arthur, Acta Goes Too Far, Says MEP, THE GUARDIAN (Feb. 1, 2012, 9:39 AM), 
available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2012/feb/01/acta-goes-too-far-kader-arif (reporting 
that the European Parliament‘s lead negotiator for ACTA resigned from his position over concerns 
about the agreement). 
 8. See Margot E. Kaminski, An Overview and The Evolution Of The Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement, 21 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 385 (2011), available at http://www.albanylawjournal.org/Docu 
ments/Articles/21.3.385-Kaminski.pdf. Kaminski asserts that ―ACTA is primarily a copyright treaty, 
masquerading as a treaty that addresses dangerous medicines and defective imports.‖ Id. at 386–87. 
 9. See TRIPS Part II, supra note 2. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol12/iss3/21
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intellectual property will not be interred along with it. Though the 
agreement may die, an autopsy could provide valuable information on 
trends in the development of IP treaties and how future treaties might 
avoid a similar fate. 
This Note argues that the digital infringement provisions of ACTA are 
the result of a progression of international IP treaties,
10
 and that its specific 
provisions regarding Digital Rights Management (―DRM‖)11 and digital 
infringement are both strongly influenced by the U.S. Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (―DMCA‖)12 and a reaction to legal battles involving new 
technology used to facilitate digital copyright infringement. This Note 
further argues that, despite the continuing rise in this infringement, 
ACTA‘s provisions go too far in protecting the interests of rights holders 
at the expense of internet service providers (―ISPs‖),13 Internet content 
providers (―ICPs‖),14 and internet users. Specifically, the Agreement 
should either have reduced standards of liability for these groups or, in the 
alternative, the Agreement should provide explicit defenses and exceptions 
for liability, and should provide specific guidelines on implementing 
concepts of secondary liability for countries that do not have well-
established legal doctrine regarding secondary liability.  
Part I begins with a comparison between ACTA and multiple IP 
treaties and statutes that predated its creation in regards to digital 
copyright infringement. Part I examines the current state of the legal issues 
regarding digital piracy with which ACTA is concerned, specifically by 
discussing court cases concerning liability for ISPs of their users‘ 
 
 
 10. The specific treaties discussed are TRIPS and the World Intellectual Property Organization 
Copyright Treaty (―WIPO Treaty‖ or ―Treaty‖). While several bilateral treaties have been created 
subsequent to these treaties, TRIPS and the WIPO Treaty provide an indication of the development of 
international standards relevant to a discussion of ACTA. See Peter Drahos, BITs and BIPs: 
Bilateralism in Intellectual Property, 4 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 791, 792–807 (2001) (discussing the 
development of bilateral trade agreements with IP provisions more stringent than those found in 
TRIPS). 
 11. Also known as Electronic Rights Management (―ERM‖), these are measures that can be 
taken on digital products (such as software and computer files that contain copyrighted works) by 
which a rights holder can prevent certain uses of these products (restricting the ability to make copies 
of music files on a computer is a common form of DRM). The use of DRM is controversial, as its 
proponents claim it is necessary to protect the interests of right holders and prevent infringement, 
while its critics claim that DRM does little to prevent infringement and prevents legal uses of 
copyrighted works. For a discussion of this tension between rights holders and users, see Timothy K. 
Armstrong, Digital Rights Management and the Process of Fair Use, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 49 
(2006). 
 12. 17 U.S.C. §§ 512, 1201 (1999). 
 13. ISPs are subscription services that provide internet access to users. See, e.g., id. § 512(k)(1).  
 14. For purposes of this note, ICPs are websites that host or link to content that is frequently the 
subject of copyright infringement litigation. 
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copyright infringement. Part II continues with a discussion of why ACTA 
is the logical outgrowth of the treaties and DMCA. Part III then posits the 
argument that the Agreement is too harsh in its minimum international 
enforcement standards. To support this latter contention, this Note will 
focus on the lack of exceptions and defenses to infringement in ACTA and 
how its provisions may allow for states to enact draconian anti-pirating 
laws that might cut off alleged infringers from the internet. Finally, in Part 
IV, this Note will discuss what a better and more equitable version of 
ACTA might look like and the types of limitations that future ACTA-like 
treaties should incorporate to strike a better balance between IP holders 
and users. 
I. THE LEGAL BACKGROUND OF ACTA 
A. International Treaties and the DMCA 
There are four aspects of ACTA that are relevant to the enforcement of 
intellectual property rights in the digital environment: digital copyright 
infringement, DRM circumvention, minimum standards for liability,
15
 and 
disclosure of personal information.
16
 It is interesting, then, that TRIPS 
spends very little time on these issues. 
Being a product of the mid-90s, TRIPS was not concerned with many 
of the technological innovations that would form the basis for modern 
digital copyright infringement. It does, however, offer the groundwork for 
a discussion of privacy rights in cases of copyright infringement. TRIPS 
allows member states to require an infringer to disclose the identity of 
third persons related to instances of infringement.
17
 In the realm of civil 
enforcement, TRIPS provides for provisional measures that can be 
adopted inaudita altera parte (without the other party present), so long as 
notice is given to the other party.
18
 TRIPS also provides for exceptions to 
 
 
 15. See ACTA, supra note 1, art. 27(7). 
 16. See id. arts. 22, 27(4). 
 17. TRIPS provides that member states may require infringers ―to inform the right holder of the 
identity of third persons involved in the production and distribution of the infringing goods or services 
and of their channels of distribution.‖ TRIPS art. 47. This article also provides that member states may 
not grant this authority if doing so ―would be out of proportion to the seriousness of the infringement.‖ 
Id. While this is the opposite of a situation in which an ISP (a third party) is compelled to provide the 
identity of an infringer, the circumstances are not altogether different, and this language could 
conceivably lay the groundwork for later law and treaties that compel ISPs to provide the identities of 
alleged infringers. 
 18. TRIPS requires members to give judicial authorities the ability to order provisional measures 
―to prevent an infringement of any intellectual property right from occurring‖ and ―to preserve 
relevant evidence in regard to the alleged infringement.‖ Id. art. 50(1)(a)–(b). These provisional 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol12/iss3/21
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the exclusive rights of rights holders, but only in broad language that 
favors the authors of copyrighted works.
19
 
The World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty 
(―WIPO Treaty‖ or ―Treaty‖), created two years after TRIPS, fills some of 
the holes in the latter Agreement concerning computers and the internet. 
Specifically, the WIPO Treaty introduces provisions obligating member 
states to create legal remedies for DRM circumvention
20
 and defining 
actionable circumstances of circumvention.
21
 It also introduces an explicit 
right of communication to the public, which could be of legal relevance to 
Internet streaming sites, even if the WIPO Treaty may not have 
contemplated streaming technology.
22
 Unfortunately, the Treaty‘s text 
offers little in the way of enforcement guidelines
23
 or limitations on the 
new rights it creates.
24
 
 
 
measures can be ordered in the absence of the party against whom the measures are taken, id. art. 
50(2), but require that ―the parties affected shall be given notice, without delay after the execution of 
the measures at the latest.‖ Id. art. 50(4). 
 19. TRIPS provides that ―[m]embers shall confine limitations or exceptions to exclusive rights to 
certain special cases which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and do not 
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder.‖ Id. art. 13. 
 20. The WIPO Treaty obligates parties to:  
provide adequate legal protection and effective legal remedies against the circumvention of 
effective technological measures that are used by authors in connection with the exercise of 
their rights under this Treaty or the Berne Convention and that restrict acts, in respect of their 
works, which are not authorized by the authors concerned or permitted by law.  
World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty art. 11, Dec. 20, 1996, 36 I.L.M. 65 
[hereinafter WIPO Treaty or Treaty]. 
 21. The Treaty requires members to create legal remedies against those who ―remove or alter any 
electronic rights management information without authority‖ or ―distribute . . . or communicate to the 
public . . . works or copies of works knowing that electronic rights management information has been 
removed or altered without authority.‖ Id. art. 12(1)(a)–(b). 
 22. The Treaty gives copyright holders:  
the exclusive right of authorizing any communication to the public of their works . . . 
including the making available to the public of their works in such a way that members of the 
public may access these works from a place and at a time individually chosen by them.  
Id. art. 8. 
 23. Member states are only obligated to ―ensure that enforcement procedures are available under 
their law . . . including expeditious remedies to prevent infringements and remedies which constitute a 
deterrent to further infringements.‖ Id. art. 14(2). 
 24. The Treaty states:  
[c]ontracting Parties may . . . provide for limitations of or exceptions to the rights granted to 
authors . . . under this Treaty in certain special cases that do not conflict with a normal 
exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the 
author.  
Id. art. 10. This limitations language is essentially the same as that used in TRIPS that favors rights 
holders. This language becomes troublesome in regards to DRM, because restrictions placed on 
copyrighted works via DRM, such as copy protection, can prevent consumers from making fair uses of 
a given work, assuming that applicable law defines what a fair use is. Arguably, the use of DRM 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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As the U.S. statutory enactment of the WIPO Treaty, the DMCA is 
concerned with much the same subject matter as the Treaty. Its provisions 
on DRM circumvention are not considerably more expansive than those in 
the Treaty; they make it illegal to circumvent DRM
25
 or, borrowing the 
―staple article of commerce‖ doctrine in patent law,26 to traffic in devices 
that primarily contribute to circumvention.
27
 This section of the DMCA 
also provides for fair use and other exceptions to a claim of infringement 
via circumvention.
28
 
The more important section of the DMCA, insofar as it relates to how 
ACTA changes international IP law, is § 512, which deals with limitations 
of liability for ISPs and subpoena powers to obtain the identities of alleged 
infringers. Section 512 strikes a bargain with ISPs in which they are given 
―safe harbor,‖ in certain circumstances, from liability for infringement 
claims that stem from certain conduct.
29
 In exchange for this protection, 
ISPs agree to, when possible, remove infringing content and disclose 
identifying information of alleged infringers
30
 when a right holder has 
provided a legally sufficient claim of infringement.
31
 
 
 
changes what is a ―normal exploitation of [a] work,‖ and thus narrows what can be legally recognized 
as a fair use. Id. 
 25. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (1999). 
 26. The Patent Act offers the foundation for secondary liability found in the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (―DMCA‖). It provides that:  
[w]hoever offers to sell or sells . . . a component of a patented machine . . . or a material or 
apparatus for use in practicing a patented process, constituting a material part of the 
invention, knowing the same to be especially made or especially adapted for use in an 
infringement of such patent, and not a staple article or commodity of commerce suitable for 
substantial noninfringing use, shall be liable as a contributory infringer.  
35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2010). 
 27. The DMCA provides that:  
[n]o person shall . . . traffic in any technology, product, service, device, component, or part 
thereof, that—(A) is primarily designed or produced for the purpose of circumventing a 
technological measure . . . ; (B) has only limited commercially significant purpose or use 
other than to circumvent a technological measure . . . ; or (C) is marketed by that person or 
another acting in concert with that person with that person's knowledge for use in 
circumventing a technological measure . . . .  
17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2) (1999). 
 28. The DMCA provides that ―[n]othing in this section shall affect rights, remedies, limitations, 
or defenses to copyright infringement, including fair use.‖ Id. § 1201(c)(1). 
 29. The safe harbor provisions apply to situations in which ISPSs transmit, cache, store, or link 
to infringing material, subject to numerous qualifications. Id. § 512(a)–(d). 
 30. Id. §§ 512(c)(1)(iii), 512(h)(5). 
 31. In addition to filing a request for a proposed subpoena and giving a sworn declaration, the 
right holder must identify the copyrighted work claimed to have been infringed and provide 
―[i]dentification of the material that is claimed to be infringing . . . and that is to be removed or access 
to which is to be disabled, and information reasonably sufficient to permit the service provider to 
locate the material.‖ Id. § 512(h) (citing § 512(c)(3)(A)(iii)). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol12/iss3/21
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B. Litigation Relevant to ACTA‟s Provisions 
To see ACTA‘s provisions in context, especially those regarding 
liability of ISPs, it is important to understand how secondary liability for 
digital copyright infringement has played out in litigation. Courts, both in 
the U.S. and abroad, have limited liability for ISPs and ICPs to instances 
in which they have contributed to or induced the infringing activities of 
users to impose liability, though precisely what conduct leads to this 
liability can be uncertain.  
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.
32
 provides a 
template for secondary liability of ISPs and ICPs under U.S. law. 
Defendants were two companies that distributed software which allowed 
users to engage in P2P file sharing.
33
 Billions of files were shared amongst 
users on a monthly basis, the majority of which defendants knew were 
copyrighted works.
34
 The defendants‘ involvement went beyond mere 
knowledge of infringement, however. Both companies actively sought to 
distribute their software to prior users of the notorious file-sharing website 
Napster after it had been found liable for its users‘ copyright 
infringement,
35
 and advertised the availability of copyrighted works 
through their services.
36
 While the general rule for secondary liability for 
copyright infringement precludes fault if a distributed product is capable 
of significant lawful purposes,
37
 the affirmative steps taken by Grokster 
and Streamcast were sufficient for a finding of liability under the theory of 
inducing copyright infringement.
38
 
 
 
 32. 545 U.S. 913 (2005). 
 33. The two defendant companies were Grokster, Ltd. and Streamcast Networks, Inc. Id. at 920. 
 34. The Supreme Court found that ―it is uncontested that [defendants] are aware that users 
employ their software primarily to download copyrighted files.‖ Id. at 923. 
 35.  See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 36. Streamcast developed a program called ―OpenNap‖ after suit was brought against Napster, 
which was designed to attract Napster users in the event that the site was shut down. Id. at 924–25. 
Grokster inserted codes into its website that redirected people searching for ―Napster‖ to its site. Id. at 
925. Both services distributed promotional material to their users informing them of the ability to use 
these services to download popular copyrighted material. Id. at 926. Also, the Court found that the 
business model for both services was relevant to a finding of liability. The revenues of Grokster and 
Streamcast came entirely from selling advertising space, and the monetary value of this advertising 
space rose in proportion with the volume of traffic to their websites. Id. 
 37. See Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 456 (1984) 
(holding that VCR distributor‘s awareness that such devices could be used for infringing purposes was 
not sufficient for a finding of secondary liability when knowledge of specific instances of infringement 
was absent and the devices could be used for significant non-infringing purposes). The Court in 
Grokster specifically found that ―mere knowledge of infringing potential or of actual infringing uses 
would not be enough here to subject a distributor to liability.‖ Grokster, 545 U.S. at 937. 
 38. The Court held that ―one who distributes a device with the object of promoting its use to 
infringe copyright, as shown by clear expression or other affirmative steps taken to foster 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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The Swedish litigation against the owners of the infamous file-sharing 
site The Pirate Bay
39
 illustrates that the rationale for finding secondary 
copyright infringement liability for ICPs in Europe is similar to that in the 
U.S.
40
 The Pirate Bay is a website that hosts ―torrents,‖ which facilitate the 
downloading of files over a P2P network.
41
 Individual users of The Pirate 
Bay had used the website to infringe copyright in multiple works,
42
 and 
the Swedish government brought a criminal action against the owners of 
The Pirate Bay.
43
 Like in Grokster, the defendants were aware that a large 
number of their users were engaged in the unlawful distribution of 
copyrighted material,
44
 and the court found that the actions of the website 
aided and abetted the principal offences of copyright infringement under 
Swedish law.
45
 
 
 
infringement, is liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third parties.‖ Id. at 936–37. After 
analyzing the conduct of Grokster and Streamcast, the Court found that, insofar as their purpose was to 
induce their users to infringe copyright, ―the unlawful objective is unmistakable.‖ Id. at 940. 
 The notorious file sharing website Napster was found secondarily liable for similar reasons. See 
A&M Records, Inc., 239 F.3d at 1024 (holding that file sharing service which facilitated users‘ 
copyright infringement through contributory action was liable for said infringement under 17 U.S.C. 
§ 106). 
 39. Stockholm Tingsritt [Stockholm District Court] 2009-04-17 B13301-06 (Swed.), English 
translation available at http://www.ifpi.org/content/library/Pirate-Bay-verdict-English-translation.pdf. 
 40. As with U.S. law, Swedish law requires that, at least for criminal liability, defendants must 
encourage the ―principal offence‖ (the copyright infringement of individual users). Id. at 36. 
 41. The torrents which The Pirate Bay hosts do not contain files themselves, but rather 
information that directs a user to the location of different segments of a file. The actual transfer of the 
file occurs through data transfers over multiple P2P networks. Id. at 14. The Pirate Bay website 
allowed users to upload, store, and download torrent files, it contained a database which allowed users 
to search for specific torrents, and it contained a tracker which allowed users to contact each other for 
file sharing. Id. at 38. 
 42. The court found that users had infringed copyright by making the works in question available 
to the public, in violation of Swedish copyright law. Id. at 41–46. 
 43. The indictment was for ―aiding and abetting‖ an offence under general principles of criminal 
law, rather than any specific statutory provision relating to liability for copyright infringement. Id. at 
47. Criminal liability can be established if a defendant aids and abets an offender in either a ―physical 
or psychological sense,‖ and requires that the defendant ―must have facilitated the execution of the 
principal offence.‖ Id. 
 44. Id. at 47–48. 
 45.  The court found that:  
[b]y providing a website with advanced search functions and easy uploading and 
downloading facilities, and by putting individual filesharers in touch with one [an]other 
through the tracker linked to the site, the operation run via The Pirate Bay has . . . aided and 
abetted these offences . . . [and] the operation carried on by The Pirate Bay does, objectively, 
constitute complicity in breach of the Copyright Act.  
Stockholm District Court, 2009-04-17 B13301-06 at 48. The Pirate Bay‘s owners were each sentenced 
to one year of imprisonment, id. at 59, which was later changed to 4–10 months of prison time for each 
defendant and joint monetary liability of approximately $6.5 million. Jacqui Cheng, Appeals Court: 
Pirate Bay Admins Still Guilty, Now With Higher Fines, WIRED (Nov. 26, 2010, 7:39 PM), http:// 
www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/11/appeals-court-pirate-bay-admins-still-guilty-now-with-higher-fines/. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol12/iss3/21
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The advent of bittorrent, the modern version of P2P software, has made 
imposing liability for individual infringers difficult. In the U.S., right 
holders can file ―John Doe‖ lawsuits to compel an ISP to reveal the 
identity of individual users, but the way that bittorrents operate can make 
identifying individuals difficult.
46
 Despite widespread file-sharing, 
however, countries have yet to impose any affirmative obligation on ISPs 
to monitor their websites for infringing activity. A recent EU court 
decision, Scarlet Extended SA v. Societe Belge des auteurs, compositeurs 
et editeurs (―SABAM‖),47 found that an injunction on an ISP to ensure its 
users were not file-sharing was in violation of EU law.
48
 The High Court 
of Australia also recently declined to impose such a requirement on the 
Australian ISP iiNet.
49
 
II. ACTA IS AN OUTGROWTH OF THESE EARLIER LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS 
Article 27 of ACTA is devoted to ―Enforcement In the Digital 
Environment‖ and focuses on subjects that, for the most part, either do not 
appear in or are covered in only a limited fashion in TRIPS and the WIPO 
Treaty. First, ACTA specifically addresses infringement over digital 
networks, which neither above treaty discusses.
50
 This is an obvious and 
 
 
 46. For a discussion on how bittorrent works, see Colin E. Shanahan, ACTA Fool or: How Rights 
Holders Learned to Stop Worrying and Love 512‟s Subpoena Provisions, 15 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. 
REV. 465 (2011), available at http://scholarship.law.marquette.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1179& 
context=iplr. Users are not entirely anonymous while downloading files using a torrent, but the 
software is designed to make a ―swarm‖ of users transfer individual segments of a given file 
simultaneously, which ―allows users to become lost in the swarm, limiting rights holders‘ ability to 
identify individual users and prove infringement.‖ Id. at 475. 
 47. Case C-70/10, 2011 E.C.R., available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do 
?uri=CELEX:62010CJ0070:EN:HTML. 
 48. The court found that requiring the defendant to install a system to filter out infringing content 
and users would infringe the freedom of the ISP in question ―since it would require that ISP to install a 
complicated, costly, permanent computer system at its own expense,‖ in contravention of EU law 
requiring the enforcement of IP rights not be ―unnecessarily complicated or costly.‖ Id. ¶ 48. The court 
further held that the injunction could infringe the privacy rights of the defendant‘s customers, because 
their IP addresses, considered confidential information, would have to be collected and analyzed for 
the filtering system to work properly. Id. ¶¶ 50–51. Finally, the court felt that such a filtering system 
―could potentially undermine freedom of information since that system might not distinguish 
adequately between unlawful content and lawful content‖ and would thus result in potentially filtering 
out legal content. Id. ¶ 52. 
 49. See Roadshow Films Pty Ltd. v. iiNet Ltd. [2012] HCA 16, ¶ 77–80 (Austl.), available at 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/FCAFC/2011/23.html (denying an appeal from the Federal 
Court of Australia which found that iiNet had not ―authorized‖ the file sharing activities of subscribers 
by not doing anything to stop their acts of copyright infringement).  
 50. ACTA provides that ―each Party‘s enforcement procedures shall apply to infringement of 
copyright or related rights over digital networks, which may include the unlawful use of means of 
widespread distribution for infringing purposes.‖ ACTA, supra note 1, art. 27(2). 
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predictable change of focus, as digital piracy has become so widespread 
and the legal issues surrounding it remain uncertain. Perhaps the most 
controversial of ACTA‘s provisions, and one which appears to take a cue 
directly from DMCA § 512(h), is the provision allowing parties to compel 
ISPs to disclose identifying information of alleged infringers.
51
 Although 
this provision requires a ―legally sufficient‖ claim of infringement before 
disclosure can be compelled, ACTA does not contain any suggestions or 
minimum standards of what a legally sufficient claim might look like.
52
 
While the use of DRM is a controversial issue, the inclusion of 
provisions on the subject in ACTA is to be expected; both the WIPO 
Treaty and the DMCA contain provisions regarding its use.
53
 Particularly 
interesting about ACTA‘s treatment of DRM is that it seems to crib 
language from DMCA § 512 and adopts the ―staple article of commerce‖ 
doctrine in determining liability for those circumventing DRM.
54
 ACTA 
thus creates significantly higher international minimum standards for 
enforcing DRM circumvention than the standards that exist in TRIPS and 
the WIPO Treaty. 
 
 
 51. The provision reads, ―[a] Party may provide . . . the authority to order an [ISP] to disclose 
expeditiously to a right holder information sufficient to identify a subscriber whose account was 
allegedly used for infringement.‖ Id. art. 27(4). 
 52. ACTA allows a party to compel disclosure of identifying information when a ―right holder 
has filed a legally sufficient claim of trademark or copyright or related rights infringement, and where 
such information is being sought for the purpose of protecting or enforcing those rights.‖ Id. It 
continues by stating that ―[t]hese procedures shall . . . avoid . . . the creation of barriers to legitimate 
activity . . . and . . . preserve . . . fundamental principles such as freedom of expression, fair process, 
and privacy.‖ Id. While this language certainly appears to be backed by good intentions, it does not 
contain anything close to the specific limitations on compelled disclosure present in the DMCA. 
 53. See WIPO Treaty, supra note 20, arts. 11, 12; see also 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (1999). 
 54. ACTA requires parties to ―provide adequate legal protection and effective legal remedies 
against the circumvention of effective technological measures‖ used by artists to restrict acts ―which 
are not authorized by the authors.‖ ACTA, supra note 1, art. 27(5). ACTA then goes well beyond this 
general language and creates an obligation for parties to ―provide protection at least against‖ 
unauthorized circumvention of these measures and ―the offering to the public by marketing of a device 
or product, including computer programs, or a service, as a means of circumventing an effective 
technological measure.‖ Id. art. 27(6)(a). 
 ACTA also appears to employ the ―staple article of commerce‖ doctrine by requiring members to 
create legal remedies against  
the manufacture, importation, or distribution of a device or product, including computer 
programs, or provision of a service that: (i) is primarily designed or produced for the purpose 
of circumventing an effective technological measure; or (ii) has only a limited commercially 
significant purpose other than circumventing an effective technological measure.  
Id. art. 6(b). 
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III. HE DOES NOT FIGHT FOR THE USERS:
55
 HOW ACTA UNFAIRLY 
ADVANCES THE INTERESTS OF RIGHTS HOLDERS AT THE  
EXPENSE OF USERS 
As a preliminary matter, it is important to recognize that digital piracy 
is a serious problem that, despite methodological difficulties in coming up 
with exact figures,
56
 likely costs multiple industries billions of dollars in 
lost sales every year.
57
 Additionally, there is a tremendous disparity 
between the number of infringers and the number of people held liable for 
infringement.
58
 For these reasons, critics of ACTA do seriously need to 
consider that the ability of rights holders to profit from their works is 
substantially threatened by digital piracy. Despite the harm caused by 
 
 
 55. The titular character of the 1982 film Tron is a computer program who ―fights for the user.‖ 
Quotes for Tron, INTERNET MOVIE DATABASE, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0084827/quotes (last 
visited June 29, 2013). 
 56. For a discussion by the Dutch Government of methodological difficulties in determining the 
actual economic impact of file sharing and how speculative specific figures by their nature must be, 
see ANNELIES HUYGEN ET AL., UPS AND DOWNS: ECONOMIC AND CULTURAL EFFECTS OF FILE 
SHARING ON MUSIC, FILM, AND GAMES 3 (Willemien Kneppelhout et al. trans., 2009), English 
translation available at http://www.ivir.nl/publicaties/vaneijk/Ups_And_Downs_authorised_trans 
lation.pdf. In its findings, the study reports that file sharing ―provides consumers with access to a 
broad range of cultural products, which typically raises welfare,‖ despite the fact that ―the practice is 
believed to result in a decline in sales of CDs, DVDs and games.‖ Id. The study notes that 
―[d]etermining the impact of unlicensed downloading on the purchase of paid content is a tricky 
exercise‖ because, using music as an example, ―one track downloaded does not imply one less track 
sold‖ because of the downloaders‘ possible budget constraints. Id. Also, ―many people download 
tracks to get to know new music (sampling) and eventually buy the CD if they like it.‖ Id. 
 57. The music, film, and software industries most likely suffer the greatest harm from digital 
piracy. The Business Action to Stop Counterfeiting and Piracy (―BASCAP‖) commissioned the 
London-based organization Frontier Economics to study the economic impact of digital piracy on 
these industries globally. See FRONTIER ECONOMICS, ESTIMATING THE GLOBAL ECONOMIC AND 
SOCIAL IMPACTS OF COUNTERFEITING AND PIRACY (2011), available at http://www.iccwbo.org/ 
Advocacy-Codes-and-Rules/BASCAP/BASCAP-Research/Economic-impact/Global-Impacts-Study/.  
 The study found that the commercial value of pirated music in 2008 was between $17–40 billion, 
between $10–16 billion for pirated films in 2005, and between $1.5–19 billion for pirated software, 
with a notice that the real figures were likely closer to the upper range for each. Id. at 30–37. While 
these figures are for the value of pirated works, rather than actual lost sales, they still represent a 
commercial loss of billions of dollars if even a small percentage of pirating results in lost sales. 
ACTA‘s preamble recognizes this, ―[n]oting . . . that the proliferation of . . . services that distribute 
infringing material . . . causes significant financial losses for right holders and for legitimate 
businesses.‖ Id. 
 58. While it is extremely difficult to determine with any accuracy how many people engage in 
digital piracy, a look at the facts of Grokster give some indication of the scope of this practice. The 
Court found that ―well over 100 million copies of the software in question are known to have been 
downloaded, and billions of files are shared . . . each month,‖ making ―the probable scope of copyright 
infringement . . . staggering.‖ Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 
923 (2005). On the one hand, this means that a huge number of infringers pirated copyrighted works 
with impunity. On the other hand, such a tremendous volume of potential defendants would make 
litigation against all infringers impractical, to say the least. 
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piracy, however, ACTA‘s provisions do not strike an effective balance 
between the interests of rights holders and those of users, both failing to 
meet one of its stated objectives and failing as a matter of fundamental 
fairness.
59
 
ACTA‘s language, at least on the surface, gives the impression that 
parties to the Agreement must consider the rights and interests of users in 
enacting the Agreement.
60
 This language tends to be very broad, however, 
and when compared with the numerous enforcement and liability 
provisions which advance the interests of rights holders, appears to offer 
little more than lip service to ISPs and users. First, ACTA does not require 
any limitations on liability for ISPs,
61
 yet it still allows parties to require 
ISPs to disclose the identities of alleged infringers.
62
 This is a raw deal for 
ISPs and users, as a party can still compel disclosure from an ISP, but the 
ISP does not receive any of the ―safe harbor‖ benefits present in the 
DMCA. For how much of the DMCA ACTA borrows, this is a glaring 
omission that is potentially prejudicial to internet users.
63
 
 
 
 59. ACTA‘s preamble states that the parties desire ―to address the problem of . . . infringement 
taking place in the digital environment . . . in a manner that balances the rights and interests of the 
relevant right holders, service providers, and users.‖ ACTA, supra note 1, pmbl. 
 60. See supra note 52. The Agreement also contains provisions which call for parties, in 
implementing procedures pursuant to the Agreement, to ―[avoid] the creation of barriers to legitimate 
activity . . . and . . . [preserve] fundamental principles such as freedom of expression, fair process, and 
privacy.‖ ACTA, supra note 1, art. 27(2). 
 61. ACTA only touches on ISP liability by stating that a party may provide ―for limitations on 
the liability of, or on the remedies available against, online service providers while preserving the 
legitimate interests of right holder [sic].‖ ACTA, supra note 1, art. 27(2) n.13. Because this language 
is permissive rather than mandatory, ACTA does not require any party to establish limitations on 
liability for ISPs. A member of ACTA could thus, while entirely in accordance with the agreement, 
make ISPs liable for any copyright infringement that takes place on their websites, whether or not the 
ISP took any steps to encourage the infringement or if it had any knowledge of the infringement. 
 62. Id. art. 27(4). 
 63. The Computer and Communication Industry Association (―CCIA‖) has publicly voiced its 
reservations about some of ACTA‘s minimum standards for IP protection to the U.S. Trade 
Representative (―USTR‖). It has stated that ―ACTA‘s enforcement-only approach has the effect of 
promoting U.S. style enforcement provisions without U.S. style exceptions to those provisions,‖ and 
that omissions of ―fair use or any of the other exceptions and limitations in U.S. law upon which 
exporters depend constitutes a missed opportunity to promote opportunities for U.S. Industry.‖ 
Matthew Schruers, Comments of the Computer and Communications Industry Association on the Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, at 2–3 (Feb. 15, 2011), available at http://infojustice.org/wp-content/ 
uploads/2011/02/CCIA-Comments-to-USTR.pdf. The CCIA also tied such exceptions to economic 
growth, citing research indicating that in the U.S. in 2010, industries relying upon these exceptions 
generated $281 billion in goods and services. Id. at 3 (citing THOMAS ROGERS & ANDREW 
SZAMOSSZEGI, FAIR USE IN THE U.S. ECONOMY: THE ECONOMIC CONTRIBUTION OF INDUSTRIES 
RELYING UPON FAIR USE 6 (2010), available at http://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/ 
2010/04/fairuseeconomy.pdf). It encourages the USTR to ―export . . . a fair use concept overseas,‖ and 
argues that agreements like ACTA constitute a failure to do so. Schruers, supra, at 7. The CCIA feels 
that an agreement like ACTA which ―facilitates strong enforcement without encouraging fair use and 
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ACTA also contains procedural deficiencies in its allowance for 
provisional measures.
64
 ACTA borrows much of its provisional measures 
language from TRIPS, allowing for provisional measures to be taken 
inaudita altera parte.
65
 A significant difference between TRIPS and 
ACTA, however, is that ACTA drops the TRIPS requirement for notice to 
the affected party; it only requires that an applicant provide evidence and a 
security.
66
 Further, ACTA requires that members provide for injunctive 
relief in civil suits, but it does not indicate under what circumstances such 
relief should be available.
67
 This is yet another conspicuous omission, as 
injunctive relief is an extraordinary remedy and should not be granted 
lightly. U.S. law, for example, has specific requirements for when an 
injunction can be issued in a copyright infringement claim.
68
 
ACTA does not contain any specific section or provision on limitations 
or exceptions like those present in TRIPS and the WIPO Treaty. The 
language promoting ―fundamental principles such as freedom of 
expression, fair process, and privacy‖ are a nice thought, but are less 
protective of users than even the anemic limitations present in ACTA‘s 
two predecessor treaties.
69
 The inclusion of explicit defenses may not be 
 
 
other exceptions will have the practical effect of promoting a copyright framework that is inconsistent 
with U.S. law and harmful to U.S. businesses.‖ Id. 
 64. See ACTA, supra note 1, art. 12. 
 65. Id. art. 12(2). 
 66. ACTA only mandates that judicial authorities require an applicant to ―provide any reasonably 
available evidence in order to satisfy themselves . . . that the applicant‘s right is being infringed or that 
such infringement is imminent, and to order the applicant to provide a security . . . .‖ Id. art. 12(4). 
Parties have discretion in determining what may constitute a security, but ACTA specifies that it may 
be ―in the form of a bond conditioned to hold the defendant harmless from any loss or damage 
resulting from‖ inspection or detention of any goods in the event of non-infringement. Id. art. 18. 
There is at least one redeeming feature in this section, however, as it provides that ―where it is 
subsequently found that there has been no infringement . . . the judicial authorities shall have the 
authority to order the applicant . . . to provide the defendant appropriate compensation for any injury 
caused by these measures.‖ Id. art. 12(5). 
 67. Id. art. 8(1). 
 68. Injunctive relief is not automatically awarded upon a finding of copyright infringement. To 
be awarded injunctive relief, the plaintiff in any type of intellectual property infringement claim must 
satisfy a four-element test. The plaintiff must show: 
(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at law, such as 
monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the 
balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; 
and (4) that the public interest would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.  
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (emphasis added); see also WILLIAM F. 
PATRY, 6 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 22:74 (2011). 
 69. Article 10 of the WIPO Treaty explicitly allows parties to create exceptions, and by 
implication, TRIPS allows them. ACTA, by contrast, only allows ―a party [to] adopt or maintain 
appropriate limitations or exceptions to measures implementing the provisions‖ related to DRM 
circumvention. ACTA, supra note 1, art. 27(8). Not only are these limitations vague, their exclusion in 
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necessary for countries such as the U.S. that have copyright law with 
robust and well-established bodies of case law that include defenses such 
as fair use,
70
 but not all parties to ACTA have such defenses. For example, 
a recent court decision in Belgium, Copiepresse v. Google, found the 
search engine Google liable for copyright infringement because it allowed 
access to ―cached‖ versions of copyrighted newspaper articles. There is 
little question that this practice would be allowed under U.S. law,
71
 
indicating that even European countries can be much more restrictive than 
the U.S. in their defenses to copyright infringement.
72
 
 
 
other provisions of the Agreement may suggest that they do not apply elsewhere. Kaminski, supra note 
8, at 395. 
 Provisions on fair use and other common defenses to copyright infringement are entirely absent in 
ACTA. Likewise, neither TRIPS nor the WIPO Treaty define such exceptions, but it is disconcerting 
that ACTA, in establishing much higher international standards for infringement and enforcement, 
does not balance such new standards with new limitations. 
 70. For examples of fair use jurisprudence in the digital environment, see Kelly v. Arriba Soft 
Corp., 336 F.3d 811 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that a search engine which stores and displays low-
resolution ―thumbnails‖ of copyrighted images engaged in a fair use of those images because they 
were used for only an incidentally commercial purpose and, because the thumbnail images served a 
different purpose from original images, they were transformative); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, 
Inc., 508 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding that the transformative aspects of thumbnail images in a 
search database outweigh the speculative harm caused by potential customers downloading such 
thumbnails to their phones instead of purchasing the images from the artist); Field v. Google Inc., 412 
F.Supp.2d 1106, 1123 (D. Nev. 2006) (affirming Kelly and extending the Ninth Circuit‘s decision to 
cached copies of copyrighted works, finding that cached web pages are present for a transformative, 
rather than superseding, purpose and are therefore a fair use). 
 71. Cases such as Kelly v. Arriba Soft and Field v. Google would likely dictate a finding of non-
infringement in these instances, especially since the news stories were not available in their entirety 
through cached pages. 
 72. The Belgian court of appeals for Brussels found that Google‘s practice of ―caching‖ (storing 
snapshots of web pages on a searchable database that are accessible even after the content is no longer 
reachable through its search engine) constituted copyright infringement. La Cours d‘appel (CA) [Court 
of Appeal] de Bruxelles, May 5, 2011 (Belg.), English translation available at http://static.arstechnica 
.com/CopiepresserulingappealGoogle_5May2011.pdf. 
 The court found that Google‘s caching of newspaper articles did not fall within the caching 
exception of EU Directive 2001/29‘s preamble 33, because it did not show that caching was ―an 
intrinsic and essential part of a technological process . . . enabling efficient transmission in a network 
between third parties . . . by an intermediary . . . .‖ Id. ¶ 25 (internal quotation marks omitted). The 
court was also not convinced that Google‘s caching of the articles was sufficiently ―transient‖ to fall 
within the directive‘s exceptions, holding that ―[a]n act of reproduction can be qualified as ‗transient‘ 
. . . only if its duration is limited to what is necessary for the proper completion of the technological 
process in question,‖ and that the reproduction will be automatically deleted when the process has 
been completed. Because Google‘s cached version of a given article remains available free of charge 
for as long as the website hosting the article makes it available, the court held that Google could not 
enjoy this exception, either. Id. ¶ 26. 
 The Belgian court further held that the Google News service‘s practice of copying short excerpts 
from news articles also constituted copyright infringement. It felt that the purpose of this practice was 
to, in effect, supplant the original news story by ―allow[ing] readers to find out the essential 
information the publisher and journalist wanted to convey,‖ because readers could understand the main 
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It may seem counter-intuitive to argue that an increase in digital piracy 
should necessitate international enforcement standards to be friendlier to 
users and ISPs, but legislation that has been and currently is created in 
response to digital piracy illustrates why an international IP scheme should 
show major concern for the rights of users and ISPs. In early 2012, The 
U.S. House of Representatives was scheduled to vote
73
 on the intensely 
unpopular Stop Online Piracy Act (―SOPA‖),74 which was strongly 
opposed by a large number of persons and companies within the 
technology industry, as well as consumers‘ rights groups.75 While 
ostensibly directed at foreign ―rogue‖ websites that host infringing content 
but either do not comply with DMCA takedown requests or are outside of 
U.S. jurisdiction, the bill contained provisions that would have affected 
legitimate American businesses as well. The payment processors and/or 
advertisers for an allegedly infringing website would have only five days 
in which to comply with a termination notice, and the owners of the 
website would have an equally small window in which to file a response 
explaining why they were not infringing the rights of the complainant to 
avoid being cut off from funds or advertising.
76
 This provision, as SOPA‘s 
detractors contended, would allow a rights holder to effectively terminate 
the funding for websites and shut them down without any finding of 
copyright infringement, even if the party filing the complaint does not 
have any rights to the work in question. Review of the termination notice 
can occur after action has been taken, but in many cases the damage will 
have already been done.
77
 Other criticisms include allegations that SOPA 
 
 
events of a given story within Google‘s short excerpt and would thus not need to read the entire article 
unless they wanted additional details. Id. ¶ 28. 
 73. House Majority Leader Eric Cantor suspended a vote on the Stop Online Piracy Act 
(―SOPA‖), claiming that he would ―not bring the bill to the floor unless there‘s real consensus on the 
bill.‖ Mike Masnick, SOPA Delayed; Cantor Promises It Won‟t Be Brought To The Floor Until „Issues 
Are Addressed,‟ TECHDIRT (Jan. 13, 2012, 11:57 PM), http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20120113/23 
560217407/sopa-delayed-cantor-promises-it-wont-be-brought-to-floor-until-issues-are-addressed.shtml. 
 74. H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (2011).  
 75. Some of SOPA‘s more notable opponents include American Express, AOL, eBay, Google, 
YouTube, Reddit, Tumblr, Twitter, Yahoo!, Daily Kos, the ACLU, and several video game 
companies. See List of Those Expressing Concerns with SOPA & PIPA, CTR. FOR DEMOCRACY AND 
TECH. (Jan. 15, 2012), http://www.cdt.org/report/list-organizations-and-individuals-opposing-sopa (last 
updated Jan. 25, 2012).  
 76. H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. §§ 103(b)(1)–(2), (5) (2011). 
 77. See Corynne McSherry, SOPA: Hollywood Finally Gets a Chance to Break the Internet, 
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUNDATION (Oct. 28, 2011), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/10/sopa-
hollywood-finally-gets-chance-break-internet. McSherry criticizes the short 5-day window which 
payment processors for allegedly infringing websites have to comply with infringement notices. Id. 
She argues that it is extremely difficult for allegedly infringing sites to prepare a sufficiently thorough 
response to a notice during this time period, and that payment processors have no obligation to abide 
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would violate the First Amendment
78
 and human rights, as well as 
endanger whistleblowers.
79
 Though SOPA may not be permissible under 
current U.S. law, it appears to be fully compliant with ACTA. 
The Spanish government in 2012 enacted legislation that appears to be 
similar to SOPA. The so-called Sinde Law provides for measures that 
―will give the authorities the power to swiftly close file-sharing sites or 
have them blocked at the ISP level‖ within ten days of a complaint by 
right holders.
80
 In Italy, legislation is currently under consideration that 
might require ISPs to filter services that infringe copyright and could 
 
 
by them even if one is made. Essentially, this would incentivize right holders to send out a flurry of 
―bogus complaints‖ in the hope of effectively shutting down current or potential competitors. Id.  
 SOPA also includes a provision that would make the streaming of ten or more copyrighted works 
in a 6-month period online ―for purposes of commercial advantage or private financial gain‖ a felony. 
H.R. 3261, § 201. Because the ―commercial advantage or private financial gain‖ language is open to 
interpretation, it could arguably include websites that possess any type of revenue stream or 
advertising income, even if the streaming itself is not intended for any type of financial gain. 
 78. See Laurence H. Tribe, The “Stop Online Piracy Act” (SOPA) Violates the First Amendment 
(Dec. 6, 2011), available at http://www.scribd.com/doc/75153093/Tribe-Legis-Memo-on-SOPA-12-6-
11-1. Harvard professor Tribe argues that § 103(a) of SOPA, which covers notice and termination 
procedures for allegedly infringing websites violates the prior restraint doctrine because:  
it delegates to a private party the power to suppress speech without prior notice and a judicial 
hearing. This provision of the bill would give complaining parties the power to stop online 
advertisers and credit card processors from doing business with a website, merely by filing a 
unilateral notice accusing the site of being ―dedicated to theft of U.S. property‖—even if no 
court has actually found any infringement. The immunity provisions in the bill create an 
overwhelming incentive for advertisers and payment processors to comply with such a 
request immediately upon receipt. 
Id. at 1.  
 Tribe also argues that because of SOPA‘s ambiguities in defining which websites fall under the 
definition of ―dedicated to theft of U.S. Property,‖ many websites will in effect have to monitor their 
websites for infringing activity, even if no complaint of such activity is made. Id. at 2. This is an 
intrusive obligation not present in the DMCA and would likely lead to a chilling effect by which 
websites would not engage in constitutionally protected speech ―for fear that they will be accused of a 
SOPA violation and suffer a cutoff of revenue from online advertising or credit card payments for 
transactions,‖ thereby chilling innovation of internet companies. Id. at 2–3.  
 79. See Trevor Timm, Proposed Copyright Bill Threatens Whistleblowing and Human Rights, 
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Nov. 2, 2011), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/11/proposed-
copyright-bill-threatens-whistleblowing-and-human-rights (arguing that provisions enabling private 
individuals to give takedown notices ―could target websites behind important Internet projects such as 
Tor, the anonymity network that has been vital for protecting activists from government surveillance in 
Tunisia and Egypt.‖). Id. Because the website can be used to mask one‘s IP address while 
downloading content, ―[c]orporations concerned about users illegally downloading music could use 
SOPA to force Visa and Mastercard to cut off donations to Torproject.org—despite Tor‘s aim to 
facilitate human rights activism, not piracy.‖ Id. These criticisms also concern SOPA‘s applicability to 
sites such as Wikileaks, which encourage whistleblowing. 
 80. See Website Blocking Law Implemented By New Spanish Government, TORRENT FREAK (Jan. 
2, 2012), http://torrentfreak.com/website-blocking-law-implemented-by-new-spanish-government-120 
102/. 
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blacklist individual users who are only accused of infringement.
81
 France 
and the U.K., among other parties to ACTA, are either considering or have 
already enacted ―three strikes‖ laws that allow authorities to blacklist users 
or ISPs for repeated instances of copyright infringement.
82
  
IV. WHAT A BETTER, FAIRER IP TREATY MIGHT LOOK LIKE 
With ACTA‘s future steadily becoming less certain, future IP treaties 
concerned with copyright infringement would do well to look at the 
Agreement‘s shortcomings and address them accordingly. The digital 
copyright infringement provisions of ACTA address a serious problem, 
but the Agreement‘s most serious deficiency is that it does not attempt to 
provide limitations on the new authority it grants to parties. Enumerating 
limitations and exceptions, both mandatory and permissive, could make 
ACTA much more balanced.
83
 In the case of compelling ISP disclosure of 
the identity of alleged infringers, the Agreement could also simply adopt 
the ―safe harbor‖ provisions of the DMCA,84 which would make the 
document considerably less hostile to ISPs. ACTA‘s purely permissive 
language about limiting liability for ISPs is also woefully inadequate
85
 and 
allows for overly restrictive legislation to be enacted in countries with less 
 
 
 81. See Loek Essers, Italy Prepares „One Strike‟ Anti-piracy Law, PC WORLD (Sept. 22, 2011, 
4:10 PM), http://www.pcworld.com/businesscenter/article/240413/italy_prepares_one_strike_antipiracy_ 
law.html; see also Timothy B. Lee, UN Report: “Three Strikes” Internet Laws Violate Human Rights, 
ARS TECHNICA (June 3, 2011, 3:20 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2011/06/un-free-
speech-watchdog-blasts-three-strikes-rules.ars. 
 82. See Alberto J. Cerda Silva, Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights By Diminishing Privacy: 
How the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement Jeopardizes the Right to Privacy, 26 AM. U. INT‘L L. 
REV. 601 (2011). Silva identifies the concept of ―three-strikes‖ internet laws as ―a domestic legal 
mechanism allowing the disconnection of a supposed infringing Internet user . . . after the user has 
received warnings about, and failed to cease copyright infringement occurring via his Internet 
account.‖ Id. at 630. He further discusses how such policies are fully in line with ACTA‘s provisions, 
and how early drafts of the Agreement actually encouraged the adoption of three-strikes policies, but 
have since backed off such advocacy due to unpopularity and disagreement during negotiations. Id. at 
633–34. 
 83. For an example of specific limiting language in a multi-national document, see Council 
Directive 2001/29, 2001 O.J. (L 167) (EC). This EU directive provides for numerous exemptions to 
copyright holders‘ rights, such as reproduction for educational purposes, parody, criticism, and various 
non-commercial uses. Id. art. 5. While these limitations are almost entirely permissive, rather than 
mandatory, and their allowance is confined to the ―do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the 
work or other subject-matter and do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the 
rightholder‖ language in TRIPS and the WIPO Treaty, they at least recognize the balancing of interests 
of rights holders and users as a priority. Id. art. 5(5); see also TRIPS, supra note 2, art. 13; WIPO 
Treaty, supra note 20, art. 10.  
 84. 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)–(d) (1999). 
 85. ACTA, supra note 1, art. 27 n.13. 
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well-defined bodies of law regarding digital copyright infringement or less 
robust defenses for infringement.
86
 
A simple adjustment to ACTA that would help to balance out some of 
the Agreement‘s weaknesses could be the elimination of provisions that 
require parties to adopt principles of secondary liability for copyright 
infringement.
87
 Not all parties to ACTA have well-established principles 
of secondary liability, if such principles exist at all.
88
 Imposing this legal 
concept onto the courts and legislatures of countries without a pre-existing 
framework for imposing and limiting such liability could lead to 
unintended consequences for websites with substantial international 
operations.
89
 There is a problem with excluding the requirement of 
secondary liability, though; because file sharers are so difficult to identify 
and track down, rights holders would likely not have a particularly 
effective means of preventing the infringement of their works without the 
ability to bring suit against ISPs. To strike a balance between protecting 
rights holders‘ interests and those of ISPs, ACTA could explicitly define 
maximum standards for imposing secondary liability which its parties 
could not exceed. Considerable deliberation would be necessary in 
ensuring these standards accommodate the needs of each member nation, 
but the DMCA again provides a good starting point. 
Perhaps it is too optimistic to hope for a new limitation on an old 
concept, but ACTA is a missed opportunity to address the controversy 
surrounding the use of DRM and how it might contribute to, rather than 
prevent, digital infringement. A common reason for file sharing given by 
opponents of the practice is the desire to get something for nothing, 
essentially to ―steal‖ the copyrighted content.90 If this content is protected 
 
 
 86. Belgian law, for example, does not have a fair use defense that is comparable to U.S. law, 
and EU law does not fill this gap. See, e.g., La Cours d‘appel (CA) [Court of Appeal] de Bruxelles, 
May 5, 2011 (Belg.). Spain and Italy, among other countries, are also in the midst of creating and 
enacting legislation that imposes excessive liability on ISPs for the copyright infringement of their 
users. See Website Blocking Law Implemented By New Spanish Government, supra note 80; see also 
Essers, supra note 81. The Dutch parliament, however, has recently introduced a bill that would 
explicitly allow users to create remixes and ―mashups‖ of copyrighted works. Robert Chesal, Loosen 
Up Copyright Law, Says Dutch Government, RADIO NETH. WORLDWIDE (Feb. 13, 2012, 10:03 AM), 
http://www.rnw.nl/english/article/loosen-copyright-law-says-dutch-government. 
 87. ACTA, supra note 1, art. 27(6). 
 88. See Schruers, supra note 63, at 9. 
 89. In his letter to the USTR, Schruers points out that because secondary liability is absent in 
both multilateral IP treaties and the domestic law of many countries, ―including secondary liability in 
ACTA would represent a major change in the framework of international IP law, and would go far 
beyond the enforcement focus of ACTA.‖ Id. 
 90. For a discussion of the ideological camps in the debate surrounding DRM, see generally 
Declan McCullagh & Milana Homsi, Leave DRM Alone: A Survey of Legislative Proposals Relating to 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol12/iss3/21
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by restrictive DRM, however, then file sharers may copy the content 
simply because a ―pirated‖ copy of it is superior to the original, as it lacks 
any restrictions.
91
 Particularly for movies and music, restrictions on the 
ability to reinstall or make backup copies of content for personal use
92
 may 
deter customers who are entirely capable of and willing to pay for content 
from acquiring it through official channels. This is not to argue that ACTA 
should condemn the entire practice of implementing DRM, but a modern 
treaty concerned with digital copyright infringement should be willing to 
acknowledge that DRM potentially creates a power imbalance between 
rights holders and users and should provide a more nuanced treatment of it 
than what is present in the DMCA and ACTA‘s predecessor treaties. 
A final minor adjustment to ACTA‘s language that would make it more 
palatable would be the removal of statutory damages as a remedy for 
copyright infringement.
93
 It may be tempting to include the availability of 
statutory damages as a strong deterrent to digital piracy, as the U.S. has 
done, but such a framework can lead to damage awards that are 
incommensurate with the offense committed. Since copyright 
infringement is a civil action between private individuals, the severity of 
punitive or deterrent damages should be reined in. In cases of websites that 
 
 
Digital Rights Management Technology and Their Problems, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 317 (2005), 
available at http://msulawreview.org/PDFS/2005/1/McCullagh-Homsi.pdf. 
 91. For a discussion of this scenario and the merits of various proposed DRM schemes, see 
generally Joshua J. Dubbelde, A Potentially Fatal Cure: Does Digital Rights Management Ensure 
Balanced Protection of Property Rights?, 2010 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL‘Y 409 (2010), available at 
http://www.jltp.uiuc.edu/archives/dubbelde.pdf. 
 92. For example, prior to 2009, the Apple software program iTunes implemented DRM that 
allowed only Apple devices to play music that had been purchased through iTunes. Ruth Suehle, The 
DRM Graveyard: A Brief History of Digital Rights Management in Music, OPENSOURCE (Nov. 3, 
2011), http://opensource.com/life/11/11/drm-graveyard-brief-history-digital-rights-management-music. 
Overly restrictive DRM measures may also contribute to users pirating video games. One of the least 
popular DRM measures for computer games is a limitation on the number of times players can install a 
given copy of a game; while this may prevent illegal copying, it also means that players who upgrade 
their computers or format their hard drives may be unable to play the game. See Andy Greenberg & 
Mary Jane Irwin, Spore‟s Piracy Problem, FORBES (Sept. 12, 2008, 10:00 AM), available at http:// 
www.forbes.com/2008/09/12/spore-drm-piracy-tech-security-cx_ag_mji_0912spore.html (discussing the 
popular 2008 computer game ―Spore,‖ and how its DRM which restricts players to three installations 
of the game before having to purchase another copy may have been a reason that an unusually large 
number of people pirated the game). 
 93. The agreement requires parties to ―establish or maintain a system that provides for . . . pre-
established damages.‖ ACTA, supra note 1, art. 9(3)(a). While this is not an absolute requirement, as 
other forms of damages can be chosen in lieu of pre-established damages, ACTA still provides a 
framework that allows extremely large mandatory fines even in individualized cases of copyright 
infringement for no commercial purpose. 
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are charged with repeat offenses, the damage awards can become 
comedically large,
94
 as if something out of an Austin Powers movie.
95
 
ACTA could also look to legislation that emphasizes users‘ rights for 
some ideas on how to balance its provisions. Its drafters could take some 
cues from Brazil‘s proposed Marco Civil da Internet law,96 which treats 
access to, and use of, the internet as a civil right. While the most recent 
draft of the legislation has stripped many of its earlier protections,
97
 the 
original version severely limited ISP liability,
98
 the ability to cut off users 
from the internet,
99
 and the ability to subpoena ISPs for user 
information.
100
 The specific provisions of this proposed law may not be 
wise for IP maximalist countries to adopt in the face of rampant digital 
piracy, but Brazil‘s approach seems to offer a much preferable alternative 
to the draconian internet blacklisting laws under consideration in the U.S. 
and EU.  
These recommendations would not just benefit ISPs and users either; 
given the reactions to ACTA worldwide and SOPA in the U.S., it has 
 
 
 94. See Tom Corelis, RIAA Drops $1.65T AllofMP3 Lawsuit, Claims Victory, DAILY TECH (May 
28, 2008, 4:31 AM), http://www.dailytech.com/RIAA+Drops+165T+AllOfMP3+Lawsuit+Claims+ 
Victory/article11882.htm (discussing the later-dropped RIAA lawsuit against Russian file sharing site 
AllofMP3, seeking the maximum U.S. statutory damage amount of $150,000 per copyright 
infringement, thus resulting in total requested damages of $1.65 trillion). 
 95. In Austin Powers: The Spy Who Shagged Me, the villain, Dr. Evil, threatens to destroy 
several major U.S. cities unless he is paid 100 billion dollars by the federal government. As this scene 
is set in 1969, the U.S. president replies that asking for this sum is the same as asking for ―a kajillion 
bajillion dollars.‖ Quotes for Dr. Evil, INTERNET MOVIE DATABASE, http://www.imdb.com/character/ 
ch0026630/quotes (last visited Jan. 11, 2013). 
 96. Decreto No. 00086, de 25 de April de 2011, DIARIO OFICIAL DA UNIAO [D.O.U.] de 
4.25.2011 (Braz.), English translation available at http://www.a2kbrasil.org.br/wordpress/wp-content/ 
uploads/2011/09/Marco-Civil-Ingle%CC%82s-pm.pdf. 
 97. See Carolina Rossini, New Version of Marco Civil Threatens Freedom of Expression in 
Brazil, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Nov. 9, 2012), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2012/11/brazil 
ian-internet-bill-threatens-freedom-expression. 
 98. The legislation states that ―[i]nternet connection providers shall not be responsible for 
damage arising from content generated by third parties.‖ Decreto No. 00086, art. 14. The only 
exception to this is ―if, after receiving a specific judicial order, they do not take action to, in the 
context of their services and under the established time frame, make unavailable the infringing 
content.‖ Id. art. 15. This is in marked contrast to ACTA‘s language which permits rights holders to 
send infringement notices to ISPs or their payment providers/advertisers which, absent a response, can 
compel action without a court order. ACTA, supra note 1, arts. 8, 12; see also supra note 67. 
 99. The legislation guarantees these rights to users: ―the non-violation and secrecy of 
communications on the Internet, except under judicial order . . . for criminal investigations or the 
gathering of evidence for criminal procedures,‖ and ―the non suspension of Internet connections, 
except for debts directly related to their use.‖ Decreto No. 00086, art. 7(I)–(II). 
 100. A request for disclosure of identifying information of an alleged user must contain ―evidence 
of the occurrence of an illegal act; . . . justification for the utility of accessing the requested logs, for 
the purposes of investigation or the gathering of evidence; [and] . . . the period that the logs refer to.‖ 
Id. art. 17. 
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become apparent that restrictions on online conduct are increasingly 
unpopular. Finland, for example, has made 1Mbps internet access a legal 
right,
101
 and one of the stated goals of Sweden‘s Pirate Party is to make all 
non-commercial copying free.
102
 
CONCLUSION 
On its face, ACTA could be seen as an international agreement with 
the noble intention of combating a serious economic problem in today‘s 
society, as well as a necessary adaptation of international law on a quickly 
mutating body of law. To those unfamiliar with how the internet and file 
sharing work, its provision might look proportionate, necessary, and 
effective. In reality, however, ACTA is a rocket-powered sledgehammer 
where a surgical laser is required, at least regarding its provisions on 
copyright infringement in the digital environment.  
While increasingly strict digital copyright enforcement is inevitable in 
the face of a growing and changing tech industry, ACTA‘s harsh measures 
show a disconnect with reality. The content of article 27 of the agreement, 
combined with its general provisions on enforcement and remedial 
measures, displays either a willingness to throw the rights of users and 
ISPs under the proverbial bus to benefit rights holders, or a lack of 
awareness as to precisely what the implications and possible consequences 
of such provisions are. 
Even though the Agreement has softened somewhat since its initial 
drafts (which received especially scathing criticism), it is still a failure at 
balancing the rights of users and ISPs with those of rights holders. 
Considering how many of the concepts and how much language from 
ACTA appear to have been taken directly from U.S. law, particularly the 
DMCA, it is startling to see such a pronounced lack of balance within the 
agreement when U.S. law provides so many templates for defenses and 
exceptions to copyright infringement and liability. It is still possible for a 
country to adopt the agreement in a reasonable, balanced fashion, yet 
ACTA also permits strict legislation such as SOPA and three-strikes laws. 
It is precisely because of ACTA‘s failure to provide explicit limitations on 
 
 
 101. See Finland Makes Broadband a „Legal Right,‟ BBC NEWS (July 1, 2010), http://www.bbc. 
co.uk/news/10461048. The Finnish government has further plans to increase this legally guaranteed 
speed to 100Mbps by 2015. Id. 
 102. See Pirate Party Principles, PIRATPARTIET, http://www.piratpartiet.se/politik/piratpartiets-
principer/ (last visited June 29, 2013). In 2009, the Pirate Party won a seat in the EU parliament. 
Ernesto, How Pirates Shook European Politics, TORRENTFREAK (June 8, 2009), http://torrentfreak. 
com/how-pirates-shook-european-politics-090608/. 
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liability, defenses to copyright infringement, and robust procedural 
safeguards for rights holders to bring claims of infringement that this type 
of legislation would be possible even if ACTA were ratified.  
As a final testament to ACTA‘s misguided approach to imposing 
enforcement standards, it could very well lead to significant financial harm 
to countries which decide to adopt it in restrictive fashions. Strong DRM 
measures may actually contribute to piracy because users do not want to 
deal with the multiple restrictions placed upon legitimate copies of 
software. Further, the types of extended secondary liability that parties are 
permitted to place on ISPs under ACTA could very well stifle innovation, 
preventing potentially job-creating businesses from ever getting off the 
ground or expanding for fear that some of their users might cause them to 
become the target of a rights holder‘s complaint. When compared to the 
speculative figures for harm caused by digital piracy and file sharing, the 
economic benefits of ACTA and its enacting legislation become uncertain, 
at best. 
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